Two Theories: A comparison of Antti Revonsuo’s Biological Realism and Thomas Metzinger’s Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity
In this master thesis, a comparison is made of the two theories of mind found in Thomas Metzinger’s Being No One and Antti Revonsuo’s Inner Presence. The comparison focuses on the theoretical foundations of the theories and examines in what way they differ. Further analysis is devoted to an examination of which of the two approaches that can be said to be more plausible. Support from certain philosophical theories aid in the conclusion that Revonsuo has a more plausible foundation for his theory. The thesis ends with a short sketch of the theoretical consequences of this conclusion.
Biological Realism: A Different Point of View
Biological Realism represents an attempt to launch a research program for the science of consciousness. This is to be accomplished by placing it in a biological multilevel framework. In the present essay, I conduct an examination of Biological Realism and compare it to contemporary, externalistic views of mind and consciousness with the purpose to examine whether they are compatible. The examination shows that despite the usage of the same terminology, they essentially deals with somewhat different concepts regarding consciousness. Hence, a reconciliation is possible, and a way to accomplish this is with the utilization of cognitive representations as a basis for a theory of meaning which allows external interpretations of cognitive representations while acknowledging subjective phenomenal experiences.